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INTRODUCTION 
In their overview of recent work in European communications policy research, Natascha Just and 
Manuel Puppis observed that while the field of communications policy research has “traditionally 
proved to be a self-critical as well as self-conscious (and not always self-confident) area of 
research,”1 there is currently a greater degree of “self-confidence” in the communications policy 
research field in recent years concerning the potential to influence governments and policymakers.2 
In an overview of academics’ engagement with questions of Internet governance, Peng Hwa Ang 
suggested that academic input is most likely to be sought “where the subject matter under discussion 
is new and policy makers are uninformed,” and where “there is a culture of consultation beyond the 
circle of usual suspects of the policy makers.”3 Sandra Braman has argued that the rapidity of current 
technological change has generated a need for policy responses that go beyond those from law and 
economics, and which “turn away from the technologies themselves and towards that which is being 
mediated – the public.”4   
Aslama and Napoli identified media convergence as opening policy windows for media reformers, 
because it has disrupted established media business models and longstanding policy settlements.5 
The concept of a policy window has been defined by Margaret Wyszomirski in the following way: 
“The process of opening a policy window involves three converging streams: discovering and 
defining a problem, developing and advocating a feasible solution, and a set of supportive political 
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1 Natascha Just and Manuel Puppis, “Introduction,” in Trends in Communication Policy Research: New Theories, Methods and 
Subjects, ed. Natascha Just and Manuel Puppis (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2012), 3. 
2 Natascha Just and Manuel Puppis, “Communication Policy Research: Looking Backward, Looking Forward,” in Trends 
in Communication Policy Research: New Theories, Methods and Subjects, ed. Natascha Just and Manuel Puppis (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 2012), 20. 
3 Peng Ang Hwa, “The Academic and the Policy Maker,” International Journal of Communication 2 (2008): 451. 
4 Sandra Braman, “Mediating the Public through Policy,” in Communications Policy: Theories and Issues, ed. Stylianos 
Papathanassopoulos and Ralph Negrine (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 23. 
5 Minna Aslama and Philip M. Napoli, “Bridging Gaps, Crossing Boundaries,” in Communications Research in Action: 
Scholar-Activist Collaborations for a Democratic Public Sphere, ed. Philip M. Napoli and Minna Aslama (New York: Fordham 
University Press, 2011), 336. 
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forces. Policy windows open infrequently, and do not stay open long, but can result in major 
changes in public policy.”6 
Copeland and James have observed that the successful “opening up” of policy windows relies upon 
the confluence of three elements: 
1. Changes in the external environment, to which policy makers are compelled to respond (the 
problem stream); 
2. Developments in the political environment that generate favorable conditions for policy 
change (the political stream); 
3. The ability of “policy entrepreneurs” in bringing forth new solutions and making “strategic 
use of ideas through policy framing devices [through] the strategic construction of narratives 
that mobilize political action around a perceived policy problem in order to legitimize a 
particular solution” (the policy stream).7 
This article considers the opening (and closing) of “policy windows” in Australia in the period from 
2011 to 2013, and some wider implications of the developments of this period. I will discuss three 
public inquiries into Australian media and communications laws and policies undertaken by the 
Gillard Labor government after its re-election in 2010: the Convergence Review of media and 
communications legislation, the Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) review of the National 
Classification Scheme, and the Independent Media Inquiry into Media and Media Regulation (the 
Finkelstein Review).8 
An important driver of policy reform was the government’s commitment to building a National 
Broadband Network (NBN), and the implications this would have for existing broadcasting and 
telecommunications policy, as it would constitute a major driver of the convergence of media and 
communications access devices and content delivery platforms. What resulted was the most 
extensive review of media and communications policy in Australia since the early 1990s, that the 
present author has elsewhere referred to as a convergent media policy moment in Australian media and 
communications policy.9   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Margaret Wyszomirski, “Through the Policy Window: The Context of Cultural Policy”, Arts Education Policy Review 98 
(1997): 9.  
7 Paul Copeland and Scott James, “Policy Windows, Ambiguity and Commission Entrepreneurship: Explaining the 
Relaunch of the European Union’s Economic Reform Agenda,” Journal of European Public Policy 21 (2014): 6. 
8 Another important public inquiry commissioned during this period was the Copyright and the Digital Economy 
Review, undertaken by the Australian Law Reform Commission to review Australian copyright law and possible reforms 
to its fair use provisions. Because the ALRC’s final report was publicly released after the new Liberal-National Party 
Coalition government, headed by Tony Abbott, had come to power, it is not included in this study. See Australian Law 
Reform Commission, “Copyright and the Digital Economy – Final Report,” ALRC Report 122, Australian Government, 
Nov. 2013, accessed Mar. 24, 2014, 
http://www.alrc.gov.au/sites/default/files/pdfs/publications/final_report_alrc_122_2nd_december_2013_.pdf. 
9 Terry Flew, “The Convergent Media Policy Moment,” Institute for Culture and Society, ICS Occasional Paper Series 
vol. 3, no. 3, Sept, 2012, accessed Mar. 24, 2014, 
http://www.uws.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0004/396373/ICS_Occasional_Paper_Series_3_3_Flew_Final.pdf. 
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One notable feature of this period was that academics engaged in the process, not only as providers 
of expert opinion or as “scholar-activists” working on behalf of community-based media reform, 
law reform, and advocacy groups, but as individuals chairing these reviews while on leave from their 
universities. I had such a role as Chair of the National Classification Scheme Review, and others 
who had similar secondments included Professor Matthew Ricketson (University of Canberra) who 
co-chaired the Finkelstein Review, and Professor Jill McKeough (University of Technology, Sydney) 
who chaired the ALRC Copyright Review. There were also academics who assisted the Finkelstein 
Review in an ongoing way, such as Professor Rodney Tiffen (University of Sydney) and Professor 
Franco Papandrea (University of Canberra).  
There is an Australian tradition of engagement among media, communications, and cultural studies 
academics with policy processes, as seen in debates around cultural policy and creative industries.10 
But this does in turn raise some new questions about the relationship of academics to the policy 
process. In these instances, academics were engaged in media policy reviews not simply as policy 
advocates, but as having primary responsibility for delivering policy review outcomes. In terms of 
the policy window framework, they had responsibility for developing policy proposals derived from  
consultation with the full range of industry, government, community, and academic stakeholders. 
Such experiences bring to the forefront issues arising from direct engagement with governments and 
state agencies themselves, which challenges traditional understandings of the academic community 
as “critical outsiders” towards such policy processes. They had responsibility for sorting through 
what Copeland and James term the “primeval soup of ideas which are advocated by a range of 
policy-making actors,”11 in order to craft policy solutions that could be taken up by the “policy 
entrepreneurs” operating in the political stream.12 For a range of reasons to be considered in this 
article, this did not for the most part occur in Australia during the 2011-2013 period. 
 
THE AUSTRALIAN MEDIA POLICY CONTEXT 
The Constitution of Australia (1901), §51, grants the federal government (the Commonwealth) 
powers over ‘”postal, telegraphy, telephonic and other like services.” This has been interpreted to 
include telecommunications and broadcasting services as a federal responsibility, and these powers 
were extended under the Broadcasting Services Amendment (Online Services) Act of 1999 to also 
include the Internet. Where powers are not specified as residing with the Commonwealth, they are 
generally taken to reside with the states, and this is the case with matters pertaining to newspapers 
and magazines. For example, the Commonwealth can use its trade and commerce powers under 
§51(i) to restrict or prohibit the importation of books, films and videos; and its territories powers 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 For discussions, see Stuart Cunningham, Framing Culture: Criticism and Policy in Australia (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1992); 
Tony Bennett, Culture: A Reformer’s Science (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1998); Tony Bennett, Critical Trajectories: Culture, Society, 
Intellectuals (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2007); Graeme Turner, What’s Become of Cultural Studies? (London: Sage, 2012); 
Stuart Cunningham, Hidden Innovation: Policy, Industry and the Creative Sector (Brisbane: University of Queensland Press, 
2013). 
11 Copeland and James, 6 
12 Ibid., 3. 
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under §122 to establish national censorship and classification schemes. However, the power to 
restrict access to films and publications, as well as enforcement powers, reside primarily with the 
states and territories. 
Australian media ownership has typically been highly concentrated across both print and 
broadcasting. The International Media Concentration Research Project, led by Professor Eli Noam 
of Columbia University, identified Australia as having the most concentrated newspaper ownership 
across 26 countries surveyed, as measured by the shares of the largest newspaper group (News 
Limited, owned by Rupert Murdoch, which owned 57% of newspapers as measured by circulation), 
the top two groups, and the top four groups.13 The top four accounted for 99% of all newspaper 
ownership, as compared to 22% for the United States, 74% for the United Kingdom, and 77% for 
Canada.14 Australian media owners are also typically very powerful and politically well-connected 
media owners. Rupert Murdoch has been the most internationally famous example, but others such 
as the Packer and Fairfax families, and more recently Kerry Stokes and mining magnate Gina 
Rinehart, have also been very important. 
Proposals to reduce the concentration of media ownership have typically been successfully resisted 
by the large media companies. As well as the powerful print media interests, the major television 
station owners have typically had a strong role in influencing policies relevant to their industry, with 
the maintenance of restrictions of the number of commercial broadcasting licenses being an 
example of this ongoing behind-the-scenes influence.15 Media policy activists have typically had 
more influence over policies related to media content, with the Australian content standard for 
commercial free-to-air broadcasters being an enduring policy feature, along with rules governing 
children’s programming and program standards such as time-zone restrictions. This has often come 
in the form of a quid pro quo with the broadcasters, where monopoly profits arising from license 
restrictions provide the funding base for local content production.16   
A final point to be aware of in the Australian context is that there is not a constitutionally 
guaranteed right to free speech and freedom of expression. The High Court of Australia implied a 
freedom of political communication in the Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v. Commonwealth case 
(1992), but this is narrower than a guaranteed freedom of communication or expression equivalent 
to the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. 17  As such, government-enforced 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Columbia Institute for Tele-Information, “International Media Concentration Research Project,” Feb. 17, 2011, 
accessed Feb. 4, 2014, http://internationalmedia.pbworks.com/w/page/20075656/FrontPage.  
14 The Hon. Ray Finkelstein, QC, “Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Media and Media Regulation,” Report to 
the Minister for Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy, Australian Government, Feb. 28, 2012, 
accessed Mar. 25, 2014, http://www.archive.dbcde.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0006/146994/Report-of-the-
Independent-Inquiry-into-the-Media-and-Media-Regulation-web.pdf. 
15 Terry Flew, “The Social Contract and Beyond in Broadcast Media Policy,” Television & New Media 7 (2006): 282-305; 
Terry Flew and Adam Glen Swift, “Regulating Journalists? The Finkelstein Review, the Convergence Review, and News 
Media Regulation in Australia,” Journal of Applied Journalism and Media Studies 2 (2013): 181-199. 
16 Flew, “The Social Contract and Beyond in Broadcast Media Policy.” 
17 George Williams, “The State of Play in the Constitutionally Implied Freedom of Political Discussion and Bans on 
Electoral Canvassing in Australia,” Parliament of Australia Research Paper 10 (1996-97), accessed Mar. 25, 2014, 
www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/RP9697/97rp10. 
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censorship and classification requirements can exist under Australian law, and can be extended to 
the Internet, in ways that would not be possible under American law. 
 
MEDIA POLICY REFORM IN AUSTRALIA 
Australian media and communications policy last underwent a series of major changes in the late 
1980s and early 1990s. Under the agenda of “microeconomic reform,” adopted as a core principle of 
the Labor government led by Bob Hawke after its re-election in 1987, a commitment was made to 
enable greater competition in the telecommunications industry and to revise broadcasting legislation. 
The Telecommunications Act of 1989 ended the monopoly power of Telstra (previously Telecom), 
and enabled new entrants and greater competition in the Australian telecommunications market. The 
Broadcasting Services Act of 1992 provided a legislative framework for the development of a cable 
(pay) television sector, as well as introducing co-regulatory codes into broadcasting – allowing 
industry bodies such as Free TV Australia to handle complaints based on an industry code approved 
by the Australian Broadcasting Authority (which became the Australian Communications and Media 
Authority [ACMA] in 2005). Changes to media ownership laws passed in 1986 enabled greater 
concentration of ownership within an industry, while setting stronger limits on cross-media 
ownership. 
For the most part, legislation passed in the early 1990s has continued to frame media policy in 
Australia. The Liberal-National Party coalition governments led by John Howard from 1996 made 
only minor changes to media laws. One significant development of the Howard years was the 
passage of the Broadcasting Services Amendment (Online Services) Act of 1999, which gave the 
ACMA power to classify and censor Internet content through a complaints-based mechanism. It 
also required the Internet Industry Association (IIA) to develop a co-regulatory code of practice that 
included requirements on Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to enable their customers to filter 
inappropriate online content, and to block access to banned material upon receipt of a “take down 
notice” from the ACMA. In contrast to the co-regulatory scheme as it has applied to broadcasting, 
which has been generally supported, the extension of the Broadcasting Services Amendment to 
online content has always been contentious because it approaches online content in a manner akin 
to that of broadcasting.18   
After eleven years of conservative governments led by John Howard, a Labor government led by 
Kevin Rudd took power in November 2007. While media policy had not been a feature of the 
campaign, the new government is strongly committed to developing a National Broadband Network 
(NBN) that would provide high-speed broadband to 90% of Australian homes by 2017.19 Developed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Peter Coroneos, “Internet Content Policy and Regulation in Australia,” in Copyright Law, Digital Content and the Internet 
in the Asia-Pacific, ed. Brian Fitzgerald, Fuping Gao, Damien O’Brien, and Xiaoxing Shi (Sydney: Sydney University Press, 
2008), 49-65; Kate Crawford and Catharine Lumby, “The Adaptive Moment: A Fresh Approach to Convergent Media in 
Australia,” report, University of New South Wales, Sept. 29, 2008, accessed Mar. 25, 2014, 
http://www.crr.unsw.edu.au/media/File/The_Adaptive_Moment_Convergent_media1.pdf. 
19 Trevor Barr, “A Broadband Services Typology,” Australian Economic Review 43 (2010): 187-193. 
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as part of a strategy to promote Australia as a leader in the digital economy, as well as an attempt to 
resolve the policy impasse of who would lay fiber optic cable if Telstra believed that its competitors 
would “free ride” on its provision of broadband infrastructure, the NBN raised the issue of how 
applicable Australian broadcasting laws would be in an era where IPTV and over-the-top audiovisual 
services become more prominent. That said, the issue was not prominent during the first term of the 
Labor government, when the major communications policy issue in the public domain concerned 
the plans of the Minister for Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy, Senator 
Stephen Conroy, to introduce a mandatory Internet filter to block content that would be “Refused 
Classification” under Australian law.20  
  
AUSTRALIAN MEDIA POLICY REVIEWS 2011-2013 
After its narrow re-election in August 2010, the second Labor government – now led by Julia Gillard 
– commissioned a series of reviews of media policy and related matters.21 In March 2011, the 
Convergence Review was announced, with the goal to “review the current policy framework for the 
production and delivery of media content and communications services… [and] develop advice for 
the government on the appropriate policy framework for a converged environment,” with “regard to 
all legislation and regulatory frameworks relevant to [its] terms of reference.”22 Also in March 2011, 
the Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) was given terms of reference to review the 
Classification Act of 1995 and related legislation pertaining to censorship laws and classification 
guidelines, with reference to – among other things – “the rapid pace of technological change in 
media available to, and consumed by, the Australian community.” 23  In September 2011, the 
Independent Inquiry into the Media and Media Regulation (also known as the Finkelstein Review 
after its chair, the Hon. Ray Finkelstein QC) was established. Its remit was to examine the 
effectiveness of current media codes of practice in Australia, consider how to strengthen the 
independence and effectiveness of the Australian Press Council (APC) as a newspaper industry self-
regulatory agency, and consider other issues pertaining to media regulations on the basis of public 
interest criteria.24 Professor Jill McKeough was also seconded from the University of Technology, 
Sydney (UTS) Law School to chair the ALRC’s review of Australian copyright laws in the context of 
the digital economy, beginning in July 2012. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Crawford and Lumby; Lyria Bennett Moses, “Creating Parallels in the Regulation of Content: Moving from Offline to 
Online,” University of New South Wales Law Journal 33 (2010): 581-604. 
21 Other policy initiatives that will not be discussed in this article included developing a National Cultural Policy, as well 
as a series of other smaller inquiries into Internet gambling, data retention requirements for telecommunications 
companies and Internet Service Providers, rural and regional telecommunications, and the digital television switchover. 
22 Convergence Review Committee, Department of Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy, 
“Convergence Review: Final Report,” report, Australian Government (2011), accessed Mar. 25, 2014, 
http://www.archive.dbcde.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0007/143836/Convergence-Review-Interim-Report-web.pdf, 
110. 
23 Australian Law Reform Commission, “Classification – Content Regulation and Convergent Media,” ALRC Report 
118, Australian Government, Feb. 2012, accessed Mar. 25, 2014, 
https://www.alrc.gov.au/sites/default/files/pdfs/publications/final_report_118_for_web.pdf. 
24 Finkelstein, 13. 
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Convergence Review 
The Convergence Review dealt with what Lunt and Livingstone have referred to as the “discursive 
struggle” between consumer interests and citizen interests in developing future media and 
communications policy.25 In particular, there was the question of whether recommendations for 
regulatory reform were primarily focused on economic goals such as promoting efficiency and 
innovation in media markets, or public interest principles associated with policy areas such as local 
content production, community standards, and content diversity. 26  The Convergence Review 
Committee, chaired by Screen Australia CEO Glen Boreham, understood its own approach as 
broadly deregulatory, premised on the assumption that “the development of the digital economy 
should be led by the market,” and that unnecessary or redundant forms of regulation needed to be 
removed in order “to encourage new business and innovation and to reduce costs for businesses and 
consumers.” 27  The committee noted in the submissions it had received, and in the public 
consultations and industry meetings it conducted, that there were two distinct constituencies: “Many 
from industry argued that there is really little need for regulation at all, although some supported 
retaining regulation of commercial benefit to them. On the other hand, individuals and community 
groups identified areas where regulation should be retained and in some cases strengthened.”28 
In a report prepared for the Committee, the Australian Communications and Media Authority 
(ACMA) identified 55 broken concepts in broadcasting and telecommunications legislation – or 
elements of the current regulatory regime that were now redundant, inappropriate, or unnecessary. 
At the root of these “broken concepts” was the manner in which digital convergence was making 
media services and content increasingly independent of particular delivery technologies, meaning 
that “regulation constructed on the premise that content could (and should) be controlled by how it 
is delivered is losing its force, both in logic and in practice.”29    
In seeking to identify enduring principles that could underpin media regulation in a convergent 
environment, the Convergence Review Committee identified three enduring public interest 
principles: 
• Media ownership: Rules to set limits on media concentration and ensure diversity of news 
and commentary in order to maintain the free flow of news, commentary, and debate in a 
democratic society; 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Peter Lunt and Sonia Livingstone, Media Regulation: Governance and the Interests of Citizens and Consumers (London: Sage, 
2012), 41. 
26 It should be noted that in the Australian context, “local” content most commonly refers to media content that is 
produced in Australia. While there is some policy interest in local content defined in terms of media produced in 
particular geographical regions, largely in relation to news, this is different to the American principle of localism as defined 
by the Federal Communication Commission (FCC). 
27 Convergence Review Committee, 3. 
28 Ibid., 1. 
29 Australian Communications and Media Authority, “Broken Concepts: The Australian Communications Legislative 
Landscape,” report, Australian Government, Aug. 2011, accessed Mar. 25, 2014, 
http://www.acma.gov.au/~/media/Office%20of%20the%20Chair/Information/pdf/ACMA_BrokenConcepts_Final_
29Aug1%20pdf.pdf, 6. 
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• Media content standards: The content available on different media services available to 
Australians should broadly reflect community standards and public expectations; 
• Production and distribution of Australian and local content: Recognition of the social 
and cultural benefits of media content that broadly reflects Australian identity, character, and 
diversity, which may be under-produced in the absence of appropriate regulations.30    
One of the core questions that faced the Convergence Review Committee was how to reconcile a 
commitment to ongoing media regulation with an in-principle commitment that “citizens and 
organizations should be able to communicate freely and, where regulation is required, it should be 
the minimum necessary to achieve a clear public purpose.”31 A related issue that the committee 
faced concerned how to move from the current architecture of platform-based regulations, which 
are profoundly challenged by media convergence in the manner identified by the ACMA and others, 
towards a framework that focuses on content applied to the most significant media (based on the  
Content Service Enterprise framework discussed below) and which involved “parity of treatment of 
similar services regardless of the underlying medium, platform or device used to deliver or receive 
the service.” 32 The report noted that from the public consultations and the submissions the 
committee received, a strong expectation continued to exist that professional media organizations 
would meet appropriate content standards even if this was not expected of most online media sites. 
It also identified concerns that any relaxation of existing controls over media ownership would 
continue media concentration, with a consequent reduction in the range of news and commentary 
accessible from mainstream media outlets. 
The Convergence Review Committee ought to reconcile these challenges with its concept of a 
Content Service Enterprise (CSE) that would be of sufficient size and influence to merit industry-
specific forms of media regulation. A CSE was defined as (1) having control over professionally 
produced media content; (2) having a large number of Australian users of such content, deemed to 
be 500,000 or more users a month; and (3) to generate revenues in Australia from such Australian-
sourced professional media content in excess of $A50 million a year.33 From the Convergence 
Review’s analysis, such criteria would cover fifteen Australian media enterprises, including the major 
broadcasters and the large print media groups, but excluding – at least at this stage – companies such 
as Google, Apple, and the telecommunications service provider Telstra. The concept of CSEs 
marked out the Convergence Review’s attempt to distinguish “big media” from start-ups and user-
created content sites. It was also quite radical in its implications, addressing the challenge of 
identifying those media organizations that would continue to be of influence, and hence subject to 
greater degrees of regulation in a convergent media context where influence is no longer primarily 
defined by the content delivery platform. 
National Class i f i cat ion Scheme Review 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Convergence Review Committee, vii. 
31 Ibid., 1. 
32 Ibid., 15. 
33 Ibid., 10-13.  
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The ALRC’s Review of the National Classification Scheme was the first comprehensive review of 
media classification since the ALRC’s 1991 Review of Censorship and Classification that in turn 
formed the basis of the Classification Act of 1995. While that legislation resolved some of the 
difficulties presented by Australia’s complicated classification laws for media businesses and 
consumers, several matters remained unresolved. The failure to reach agreement on a national “X” 
classification for sexually explicit content meant that such material remained notionally illegal in 
some Australian states, although being nonetheless conspicuously available throughout the country, 
as well as being able to be purchased by mail order from those parts of Australia where it was legal 
(e.g. the Australian Capital Territory). The decision in 1995 to prohibit “R18+” rated video games 
from entering Australia on the basis of potential harm from exposure to violent video content had 
been an ongoing source of discontent among gamers, as it was obviously out of step with 
comparable nations around the world, but the need for agreement among all states and territories to 
make changes under the cooperative scheme with the Commonwealth presented an ongoing barrier 
to reform.34  
The Broadcasting Services Amendment (Online Services) Act of 1999 had placed censorship and 
classification enforcement responsibilities relating to the Internet within the communications 
portfolio, administered by the ACMA. As noted above, the Constitution of Australia does not 
prohibit governments from enforcing such bans, but the power to classify or prohibit particular 
forms of media content has historically resided with the Classification Board, as an independent 
agency administered within the Attorney-General’s Department. Moreover, a series of procedures 
exist around the decisions of the Classification Board, including the need to make its judgments and 
the rationale behind them public, the right of affected parties to appeal its decisions, and the 
recruitment of Board members from the wider community so as to be “broadly representative” of 
the Australian community. Such provisions do not apply for the ACMA in the online environment. 
As a result, considerable uncertainly existed about who had responsibility for classification decisions, 
as well as concerns among civil liberties groups about the accountability of the different regulatory 
agencies to the wider public, with the ACMA seen as being less publicly accountable for its decisions 
than the Classification Board.   
Classification legislation, like most of Australia’s media and communications laws, was designed for 
a pre-Internet age when media content was largely accessed either in a tangible physical form or 
through mass media channels such as broadcasting and cinema. The Labor government managed to 
trigger a need to review classification laws itself through the plans of the Minister for Broadband, 
Communication and the Digital Economy, Sen. Stephen Conroy, to introduce mandatory Internet 
filtering for content that would be Refused Classification (RC) under Australian law. As well as 
raising the inherent difficulty of how to deal with online content mostly hosted outside Australia, 
and enforcing mechanisms of compliance by ISPs, the proposal also drew attention to the 
problematic nature of the RC category. Under current laws, the RC category included not only 
material that was clearly illegal to produce, distribute, or possess (such as depictions of child abuse), 
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but also material that may be deemed “abhorrent” or “offensive” – raising the obvious questions of 
“by whom” and “on what criteria” – and, perhaps most confusingly, material that “promotes, incites 
or instructs in matters of crime or violence.”35 Moreover, in the absence of an “R18+” classification 
for video games, such content became de facto banned material, although it is clearly of a different 
order to extreme pornography. 
The ALRC received over 2,300 public submissions to its classification review. Of these, the largest 
number came from those calling for lifting the ban on “R18+” video games, followed by those 
calling for an approach to media classification more informed by free speech and civil liberties 
principles, and those taking the opposing view that community standards and the protection of 
children were paramount. 36  In articulating a new set of principles to inform future media 
classification laws, the ALRC took the view that while core principles such as balancing the rights of 
adults to access the media of their choice with protection of children while a benchmark category of 
“community standards” remained relevant, there was a need to develop a framework that was more 
responsive to technological change and kept classification regulation to a minimum necessary to 
achieve a clear public purpose. The commission proposed that any new classification legislation 
needed to be platform neutral in its application, so that “the obligation to classify content should be 
framed without reference to the media platform from which the content is accessed.”37 It was 
argued that a platform neutral approach to content regulation was an essential condition for a 
classification framework that would remain relevant and responsive in the context of media 
convergence and ongoing innovation in the media sector. 
The Finkels te in Review 
The context for the Independent Inquiry into the Media and Media Regulation (Finkelstein Review) 
was complaints about the hostile media coverage of the Gillard Labor government, with the impact 
of the UK phone hacking scandals and the subsequent Leveson Inquiry providing a contextual 
justification for undertaking such an inquiry. The leader of the Australian Greens, Sen. Bob Brown, 
first publicly proposed the need for an inquiry into the news media, citing anti-Greens and anti-
Labor bias in News Limited papers. Prime Minister Julia Gillard subsequently used the opportunity 
of a National Press Club address on July 14, 2011 to raise issues about the standard of political 
reporting in Australia, and asked whether News Limited had “questions to answer” about the 
conduct of its newspapers.38 When the Independent Inquiry into the Media and Media Regulation 
was announced in September 2011, its terms of reference referred to the adequacy of current media 
codes of practice and the effectiveness of self-regulation through the Australian Press Council, and 
also to the impact of technological change on the business models that had supported journalism 
and the production of news in Australia. In practice, far more of its attention was focused on the 
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36 Prior to the ALRC Review, a consultation process initiative by the Attorney-General’s Department on introducing an 
R18+ classification for computer games received over 58,000 submissions, of which 98% called for the introduction of 
such a classification.  
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issue of journalistic standards, and how to make use of regulation in order to improve them, than on 
the future of news in the context of media convergence. 
The Finkelstein Review took a “social responsibility of media” perspective, which it contrasted to a 
“marketplace of ideas” understanding of the media’s role in society and politics. It argued that the 
latter was insufficient in the context of highly concentrated ownership in the Australian newspaper 
industry, and the power of the media to shape social and political realities. It identified consistent 
findings in public opinion surveys about Australian media industry standards including low levels of 
public trust in journalists as a professional group, concerns about conflicts of interest in news 
reporting, perceptions of political bias towards the conservative parties among commercial media 
outlets (particularly newspapers), concerns about excessive media power and influence, and 
concerns about unethical behavior (particularly in relation to intrusions on individual privacy).39 
Observing that “Australia’s journalists… seem more satisfied than is the general public with their 
standards of objectivity and the general quality of their work,”40  the Finkelstein Review was 
nonetheless of the view that the current system of Australian print media regulation, which 
combines self-regulation through the adoption of standards and codes of ethics with the role played 
by the Australian Press Council as an industry-funded external complaints body, had proven to be 
manifestly inadequate in serving the public interest. 
The Finkelstein Review recommended the establishment of a government-funded statutory 
regulator, the News Media Council, which would incorporate the current functions of the APC and 
those of the ACMA that related to broadcast news and current affairs. The News Media Council 
would be made up of community, industry, and professional representatives (including academics), 
and would operate as an independent agency with the powers to address complaints, set journalistic 
standards, hold public hearings if required, and require news media outlets to publish an apology, 
correction, or retraction, or afford a person a right to reply, in relation to adverse findings. The 
News Media Council would be neither a government regulator nor a self-regulatory industry body, 
but rather a co-regulatory hybrid body, engaged in what the Report termed “enforced self-regulation” 
in which industry participants would participate in the setting and enforcement of standards, 
although participation would be required rather than voluntary.41   
The Finkelstein Inquiry was mired in political controversy from the moment it was announced, 
continuing through its public hearings, and the controversy was abundantly apparent in the 
responses to its final report. The major newspaper groups never accepted the legitimacy of the 
inquiry, arguing that it constituted an attempt by the Labor government to muzzle freedom of the 
press. This argument found ample support from the Liberal and National Parties, who defined the 
Finkelstein Review as an exercise in political payback by Labor and the Greens for negative media 
coverage. Market liberal think tanks such as the Institute of Public Affairs (IPA) rejected outright the 
inquiry’s premise of that media has a social responsibility remit, vigorously arguing that a 
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marketplace of ideas is a cornerstone of democratic freedoms, that greater competition is the only 
means to redress undue media influence, and that the rise of the Internet and the lowering of 
barriers to entry for online publishing are themselves forces driving greater media pluralism without 
the need for new forms of government intervention.42 Given this framing, the adverse reaction to 
the Finkelstein Review in the print media was no surprise, with the endeavor being variously labelled 
as “bringing the media to heel,” a “Labor plan to control the media,” and “a threat to free speech 
and to media big and small.”43 From the point of view of the media industry, Kim Williams, then-
CEO of News Limited, summarized their perspective thusly: “if print and online media are to 
continue to be able to robustly question, challenge and keep governments in check they must remain 
self-regulated, entirely independent of government.”44    
 
ACADEMIC ENGAGEMENT WITH THE MEDIA INQUIRIES 
Of the three inquiries considered here, the Convergence Review was arguably the most traditional in 
its modes of public engagement. With a three-person committee of people well known in the media 
and communication industries, and working with the Department of Broadband, Communications 
and the Digital Economy (DBCDE), the Committee primarily engaged with companies, industry 
bodies, funding agencies and professional associations that were long established in these industries, 
and were clearly stakeholders in the Committee’s deliberations. There was engagement with the 
inquiry by university-based groups, including the Australian Research Council Centre of Excellence 
for Creative Industries and Innovation, the Institute for a Broadband-Enabled Society based at the 
University of Melbourne, the Swinburne Institute for Social Research, and the Communications Law 
Centre at the University of Technology, Sydney (UTS), and individual academics such as Brian 
Fitzgerald (Law, Queensland University of Technology), Lelia Green (Communications, Edith 
Cowan University), Niloufer Selvadurai (Law, Macquarie University), and Tim Dwyer and Fiona 
Martin (Media and Communication, University of Sydney). But for the most part the Convergence 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Chris Berg, In Defence of Freedom of Speech: From Ancient Greece to Andrew Bolt (Melbourne: Institute of Public Affairs, 
2012). The latter part of this book’s title refers to a class action undertaken by a group of Aboriginal people led by Pat 
Eatock against Andrew Bolt, a high-profile conservative newspaper columnist and blogger, in the Australian Federal 
Court (Eatock v. Bolt, 2011). The court found that Bolt and his publisher, the Melbourne Herald-Sun, had contravened 
§18C of the Racial Discrimination Act of 1975 in referring to “fair-skinned Aborigines” and questioning their Aboriginal 
heritage, that his statements were likely to “offend, insult, humiliate or intimidate” those concerned, and that public 
interest or fair comment defenses were insufficient because the statements had not been made in good faith. The 
Institute of Public Affairs in Melbourne ran a high-profile campaign against the judgment, and Prime Minister Tony 
Abbott, and Attorney-General George Brandis have indicated an intention to overturn §18C of the Racial 
Discrimination Act as a consequence of this decision. 
43 “Bringing the Media to Heel,” The Australian, Mar. 3, 2012, accessed Mar. 26, 2014, 
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/opinion/editorials/bringing-the-media-to-heel/story-e6frg71x-1226287764547; 
“Labor Plan to Control the Media,” Australian Financial Review, Mar. 3, 2012, accessed Mar. 26, 2014, 
http://afr.com/p/national/labor_plan_to_control_the_media_5pEDj35GNEURaWyux4tWZM; David Penberthy, “A 
Threat to Free Speech and to Media Big and Small,” The Punch, Mar. 5, 2012, accessed Mar. 26, 2014, 
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44 Quoted in David Crowe, “Media Fears for Freedom as Watchdog Unleashed,” The Australian, Mar. 3, 2012, accessed 
Mar. 26, 2014, http://www.theaustralian.com.au/media/media-fears-for-freedom-as-watchdog-unleashed/story-
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Review engaged with the established media industry stakeholders, with only limited engagement with 
either academic researchers or activist communities. When research was commissioned for the 
Convergence Review, it was undertaken either by the ACMA (as with the “broken concepts” paper 
discussed above45), or by consultants such as PriceWaterhouseCoopers, who prepared the economic 
analysis of Content Service Enterprises. 
The National Classification Scheme Review operated according to the three-stage process applied by 
the ALRC to all public inquiries, which is that submissions are sought after release of an Issues 
Paper and a subsequent Discussion Paper, and that consultations with relevant stakeholders occur 
throughout the time period of the inquiry.46 I chaired the review on secondment to the ALRC from 
the Queensland University of Technology for the duration of the review, and did so as someone 
with a media and communications background rather than a legal one. While there was only one 
university-based research center that made a formal submission to the review, the Communications 
Law Centre (UTS), a number of individual academics made submissions; these included Lyria 
Bennett Moses (Law, University of New South Wales [UNSW]), Nic Suzor (Law, Queensland 
University of Technology [QUT]), Alan McKee (Film & Television, QUT), Cathy Cupitt (Curtin 
University), Gregor Urbas (Australian National University), and Bruce Arnold and Sarah Ailwood 
(University of Canberra).  Non-government organizations with an interest in classification issues and 
significant academic involvement also participated, including the Australian Council on Children and 
the Media, Electronic Frontiers Australia, and the Young & Well Cooperative Research Centre. 
Other academic experts consulted by the ALRC for the review included communications researcher 
Lelia Green (Edith Cowan University), economist Jason Potts (Royal Melbourne Institute of 
Technology), sociologist Mark Western (University of Queensland) and media researchers Catharine 
Lumby (UNSW), Kate Crawford (UNSW), and Andy Ruddock (Monash University).    
By far the most active response from the academic community was to the Finkelstein Review. Of 
the 75 submissions received by the review, 22 came from academics. Moreover, 10 of the 31 
individuals who participated in the public hearings associated with the review were academics. The 
chair, the Hon. Ray Finkelstein QC, was assisted by Matthew Ricketson, Professor of Journalism at 
the University of Canberra, who was seconded to the review. The Finkelstein Review also drew 
upon the research inputs of political scientist Rodney Tiffen (University of Sydney), media 
economist Franco Papandrea (University of Canberra), and media ethicist Denis Muller (University 
of Melbourne). 
The majority of submissions received from these academics were highly critical of the “marketplace 
of ideas” as a suitable governing principle for understanding the role of media in modern 
democracies, and saw the Australian Press Council as a body that lacked both appropriate powers 
and sufficient independence from media proprietors to effectively regulate the conduct of journalists 
and news organizations so as to safeguard the public interest. Despite the subsequently circulated 
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misperception that journalism academics used the Finkelstein Review process to call for more 
government regulation of the news media, very few actually favored a statutory regulator as an 
alternative to industry self-regulation.  
Margaret Simons from the University of Melbourne, who was subsequently identified in News 
Limited publications as a critic of press freedom, observed in her submission that “Government 
regulation and journalism are like oil and water. They won’t mix. Good journalism relies on being 
unauthorized, but that doesn't mean that journalists shouldn’t be held to account.”47 Simons’s 
submission, like others, favored arms’ length government funding for the Australian Press Council, 
combined with long-term funding arrangements from the industry. Other academic submissions 
argued for government support for alternative media providers or taxation arrangements that may 
support new investment in public interest journalism. 
Academic involvement in the Finkelstein Review generated by far the most political controversy, as 
many of these academics were accused of betraying the interests of the journalistic profession in 
supporting the Finkelstein Review’s recommendation for a government-funded statutory regulator 
for newspapers. Cameron Stewart, Associate Editor of The Australian (Australia’s major national 
daily newspaper) referred to a “great divide” between those who teach journalism and those who 
practice it: 
The contrasting view on Finkelstein's findings between the teachers of tomorrow's 
journalists and today's working journalists could not have been more pronounced. It 
highlights a widening rift in Australia between those who practice journalism and 
those who teach it. It is a rift being fuelled by politics, ideology and a growing disdain 
among some journalism academics for the mass media.48 
Rodney Tiffen, Professor of Government at the University of Sydney, who was involved in the 
Finkelstein Review, sought to respond to these and other criticisms that the review had “overturned 
two centuries of Western philosophy” (as John Roskam of the IPA put it) by attacking freedom of 
the press. He noted that the United Kingdom’s Press Complaints Commission, a body equivalent to 
the Australian Press Council, had been dissolved in light of its ineffectiveness as shown in the News 
International phone hacking scandal. Tiffen argued that the Finkelstein Review’s proposal for a 
government-funded News Media Council was not intended to “increase the power of government 
to censor or restrict the media in any way,” but was intended “to conciliate and resolve disputes 
about news coverage in ways that further the free flow and exchange of information rather than 
restricting it” in order “to make the media more accountable to their readers and those covered in 
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the news.”49 Matthew Ricketson, who co-chaired the Finkelstein Review, argued that the final report 
had been subject to a campaign of deliberate misrepresentation on the part of the media industry: 
The most recent and persuasive case study showing why there is an urgent need to 
reform regulation of the news media has been provided by the news media itself. 
And it’s been provided in the way they have reported on the Independent Media 
Inquiry. What they have done is to under-report a lot of what was presented to the 
Independent Media Inquiry late last year, and to either misreport the inquiry’s 
findings or to ignore large parts of the report altogether.50 
Regardless, the campaign against the Finkelstein Review had considerable public impact. The 
opposition Liberal Party moved sharply against media regulation, and linked up with the IPA around 
the notion of a “freedom agenda”. The then-Shadow Attorney-General George Brandis argued that 
“human rights and individual rights are synonymous,” and that the Liberals were the only major 
Australian political party committed to “advancing and protecting the rights of the individual” and 
the principles of the Enlightenment, against the political left whose “role… historically, [has] been to 
trample upon the rights and freedoms of individual men and women in the name of messianic 
ideological causes.”51   
This language of freedom and individual rights also came to influence elements of the political left. 
Visiting Australia at the time the Finkelstein Review published its final report, author and activist 
Naomi Wolf warned that it was “step one to fascism.”52 Notably, the activist group GetUp!, which 
tends to be aligned politically with the Australian Greens, came out in opposition to new forms of 
media regulation such as the advent of a public interest media advocate. In August 2012, the 
Director of GetUp!, Sam McLean, argued that “we believe in freedom of the press, and the model 
of regulation that has been put forward seems to us to cut across that important freedom… in an 
age of online news and media, there are a myriad of sources of news, and readers will be the 
arbiters.”53 Noting that this sounded very similar to what the IPA and the Liberal Party had been 
saying, GetUp! Soon received a Twitter message from the IPA saying “Great to have @GetUp join 
us on the barricades to defend free speech.” 
 
THE DEMISE OF MEDIA POLICY REFORM IN AUSTRALIA IN 2013 
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The government’s response to the various media reviews was a long time coming, with the Minister 
responsible, Sen. Stephen Conroy, taking almost a year after receiving the reports to finally present a 
submission to the Cabinet and the Labor caucus.54 When the proposed legislation to be submitted to 
Parliament was finally presented by the Minister on March 12, 2013, it was decidedly low-key in 
relation to the ambitions of the various media inquiries, and focused much more on current 
concerns and existing media players than on issues for the future of media raised by convergence 
and high-speed broadband access.55 Among the main recommendations were: a press standards 
model that maintained self-regulation but would beef up the role of the Australian Press Council and 
clarify its standing in relation to online as well as print media, the introduction of a Public Interest 
Test for future media takeovers and mergers, and the creation of a Public Interest Media Advocate 
(PIMA) to evaluate the implications of proposed mergers and takeovers for media diversity, and to 
act as an avenue for complaints about unfair treatment by the media. 
This was certainly not the new policy and regulatory framework that the Convergence Review 
advocated, nor did it entail a new statutory body to regulate news media content, as recommended 
in the Finkelstein Review. Nonetheless, it proved to be too much for the newspapers that reported 
on the proposals, with the Sydney Daily Telegraph using its front page to compare Stephen Conroy to 
Joseph Stalin, Mao Tse-tung, and Robert Mugabe as political leaders who wanted to control the 
media. In case the point of such a comparison was missed, the paper “photoshopped” Conroy’s 
head onto Joseph Stalin.56 It also became apparent that these more modest proposals could not be 
steered through the House of Representatives, where Labor lacked a majority and depended upon 
the support of Greens and independent MPs in order to pass legislation, and the legislation was 
abandoned ten days after it was presented to the public.   
During the five-week campaign leading up to the Australian federal election of September 7, 2013, 
neither the Liberal Party nor the Labor Party released a media policy. For the Liberals, this was not 
surprising. There was little doubt that they had the support of most large media organizations in 
Australia, who had also indicated little enthusiasm for the various media reform measures proposed 
during the 2011-2013 period.57 For Labor, however, this was akin to an admission of failure for two 
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reluctance to table detailed information to the Caucus for fear that it could be leaked to the media by Rudd supporters, 
although details of the inner workings of the Labor Caucus during this period will no doubt be revealed later in the 
writings of those who were involved. In June 2013, after an unsuccessful attempt to return to the leadership and an 
aborted leadership spill, Kevin Rudd was elected Labor leader by the majority of the Caucus, and ran for the office of 
Prime Minister in the September 2013 federal election.  
55 Terry Flew, “Low-Key Conroy Proposals Are Media Reform Lite,” The Conversation, Mar. 12, 2013, accessed Mar. 26, 
2014, http://theconversation.com/low-key-conroy-proposals-are-media-reform-lite-12778. 
56 Gemma Jones, “These Despots Believe In Controlling The Press: Conroy Joins Them”, Daily Telegraph, Mar. 19, 2013, 
pp. 1, 4-5.  
57 It is often difficult to gauge if any media organization supported one political party or another unless they donated to 
the respective campaigns, and we do not know at this stage whether any did donate to parties in the 2013 federal election 
(they tend not to, as a general rule). What we do know is that of all of the newspaper editorials published advocating a 
vote for one or other party, only one newspaper, the Melbourne Age, recommended a vote for Labor. At least two 
newspapers, the Sydney Daily Telegraph and the Brisbane Courier-Mail, ran very strongly against Labor, although this did not 
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reasons. First, they had associated the development of a high-speed National Broadband Network 
with the need for broader transformations of media law and policy, and the fact that so little had 
come from policy reviews designed to facilitate this was indicative of a degree of policy confusion 
over the issue within the government. Second, concerns about media bias remained widespread 
among Labor MPs and supporters, as indicated when Kevin Rudd railed against the concentration 
of newspaper ownership in the hands of News Limited titles, and whether they were promoting the 
interests of their owner, Rupert Murdoch.58   
 
CONCLUSION 
In considering the rise and fall of media policy reform proposals in Australia during the 2011-2013 
period, and the possible wider implications for the Australian experience, one important issue is 
whether there was in fact a “policy window” for media reform during this period and the 
implications this has for any future initiatives in this field. If we take the three “streams” that are 
referred to in the literature – the problem, the political, and the policy streams – there were, and 
continue to be, clear changes in the external environment (the problem stream) associated with 
media convergence, digital networks, multiplatform media, and user-created content that make it 
necessary to review existing media and communications laws.   
At the same time, the political climate could not have been worse for the Labor government in 
pursuing such a reform agenda. With the absence of a majority in either the House of 
Representatives or the Senate, it was very beholden to the support of the Greens and minor parties 
in what was a highly politically charged period during which the Liberal and National opposition 
parties had clearly indicated its unwillingness to support the Gillard Labor government in passing 
legislation. This contrasts to the period of the late 1980s and early 1990s, during which the Hawke 
and Keating Labor governments had a clear parliamentary majority in the House of Representatives, 
even if it was dependent on the support of minor parties and independents in the Senate.  
But to blame adverse political circumstances would be to neglect the degree to which there was also 
a failure of policy leadership during this period. On the one hand, the Minister for Broadband, 
Communications and the Digital Economy, Sen. Stephen Conroy, did succeed in strategically 
constructing a narrative for change through promotion of the National Broadband Network (NBN), 
which had considerable popular support and gave credence to the notion of a link between 
government investment in broadband infrastructure and new opportunities for Australians in the 
digital economy. But for much of Conroy’s tenure in the Ministry, discussion was dominated by a 
proposal for a mandatory Internet filter, which was abandoned in late 2012 after several years of 
protracted argument. Whether fairly or otherwise, this gave the Minster a reputation for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
lead to particularly large swings toward the Liberals in those electorates where they may have been most influential, such 
as the marginal seats of western Sydney and suburban Brisbane. 
58 Terry Flew, “FactCheck: Does Murdoch Own 70% of Newspapers in Australia?” The Conversation, Aug. 8, 2013, 
accessed Mar. 26, 2014, http://theconversation.com/factcheck-does-murdoch-own-70-of-newspapers-in-australia-16812. 
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censoriousness on which groups like the IPA, as well as the opposition Liberal and National parties, 
were able to capitalize when the Finkelstein Review was announced.  
The major political development of the 2011-2013 period was that classical liberal commitments to 
freedom of speech and a free press were successfully juxtaposed against threats of state control, not 
least because all newspapers consistently framed the Finkelstein Review in such terms. The IPA 
played a leading role in this, and saw both its membership and influence within the Liberal Party 
grow substantially during this period. The perception that the Finkelstein Review had been 
commissioned as a form of political payback by Labor as a response to hostile media coverage, with 
the support of the Greens, proved very hard to shake. Even if concerns about media bias were valid 
– and there is considerable evidence to suggest that they were – there are nonetheless considerable 
problems with calling on state agencies to intervene on such grounds. In this respect, the move of 
left-liberal activist groups such as GetUp! towards an anti-media reform position was indicative of a 
wider sea change against the Minister and the government during this period.  
With a change of federal government, there has been a significant winding back of the Labor’s NBN 
program, both in terms of costs and ambition, and the coalition has been clear that its own 
philosophical position towards media is both more “hands-off” than that of Labor and more in line 
with the major print and broadcast media interests. At the same time, the issues arising for media 
policy and platform-based regulations in the context of convergence remain important, ranging from 
questions of whether to regulate access to certain forms of online media content, to the ability of 
Australians to access over-the-top content streaming services like Netflix. The Finkelstein Review 
was clearly seen as a politicized inquiry, and the proposals announced by Labor in 2013 have no 
traction with a right-of-center government. It is still the case, however, that challenges to existing 
media laws and policies arising from convergence around issues such as cross-platform media 
ownership and control, the future of media content classification, and the future of local content 
rules in the digital economy context remain important. Therefore, the standing of the public 
inquiries that dealt with these issues remains relevant, even if the “policy window” that led to their 
initial establishment is now effectively closed.  
One of the interesting features of the inquiries discussed herein has been the extent of academic 
involvement, with academics both working in support of activist agendas towards particular policy 
fields (media ownership, copyright laws, journalism ethics, media content laws, etc.) and serving as 
chairs and expert researchers in these public inquiries. Sandra Braman has pointed out that “policy 
was defined as a research context for communications even before the field per se existed,”59 and 
there is a long – if at times controversial – history of extended interactions between communications 
researchers and the policy process. The involvement of reasonably senior academics in chairing such 
reviews under secondment from their universities is a process that has not been widely researched 
thus far. But it may be on the increase, at least in the Australian context. The former Head of the 
Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, Peter Shergold, has spoken about the need “to widen 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Sandra Braman, “Policy as a Research Context,” in Communication Researchers and Policy-Making, ed. Sandra Braman 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003), 35. 
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this debate about the making of public policy and the role of academics, to include those who 
advocate for policy, those who deliver policy, and those who are the recipients of policy,” arguing 
that “each of those groups needs to be empowered if we’re going to get better public policy made, 
and that academics can play a key role in that.”60    
In this light, the relationship of academics as policy administrators to the various interest groups 
associated with a particular policy domain will be more complex than that of simply siding with one 
set of interests over another – for example, supporting activists and NGOs over business interests. 
Philip Schlesinger has recently observed that “to be a critic as well as a kind of insider raises hard 
questions about whether one can actually ride two horses at once,”61 and the case studies discussed 
here provide some opportunity to consider such a conundrum in the context of actual media policy 
practice. This may in turn leave those academics open to accusations of bad faith within both 
academic and activist communities for being “intellectually thin” in their evaluations,62 even as they 
pursue the often stated goal of universities in other contexts of being actively engaged with public 
policy as part of the process of knowledge exchange. There is much more to be done on evaluating 
the experience of academics as policy insiders, and not simply scholar-activists seeking to influence 
policy processes from the outside, ranging from the general issues of how policy relates to politics, 
to how to work with NGO interests, and whether – and in what ways – it matters which political 
party is in office at the time.  
The final point I would make refers to an interesting tension in media policy reform advocacy in a 
post-Internet world, which could be described as a tension between “statists” and “libertarians.” 
Much of the discourse in recent years about the rise of neoliberalism in media policy and other fields 
of public policy has associated it with what Clive Barnett described as “a clearly defined, purposive 
project pursued by specifiable interest groups” to delegitimize the role of state agencies and to 
“subordinate public values to those of the market.”63 In practice, however, the picture is much more 
complicated. In the case of the National Classifications Scheme Review, the notionally “progressive” 
position was one that wanted the agencies of the state out of regulating access to violent video 
games or pornography on the Internet, and was considerably more comfortable with changes to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Peter Shergold, “Opening Up Policy Development for Knowledge Exchanges,” speech at HASS on the Hill, Mar. 22, 
2011, accessed Mar. 27, 2014, http://www.chass.org.au/speeches/SPE20110322PS.php. At the same CHASS (council 
for the Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences) forum, the then-Head of the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, 
Terry Moran, expressed doubt that the institutional cultures of academia and the public service could be reconciled, 
observing that the structure of incentives within universities militated against ongoing engagement with government in 
forms that were usable by the government agencies themselves, as compared to the information they receive from 
consultants and think tanks. Moran observed that “both public servants and academics can have an unfortunate 
tendency to isolate themselves in familiar worlds with familiar people,” and that while he saw this as a problem for both 
entities, he saw little pressure on either side to resolve the impasse. See Terry Moran, “Opening Up Policy Development 
for Knowledge Exchanges,” speech at HASS on the Hill, Mar. 22, 2011, accessed Mar. 27, 2014, 
http://www.chass.org.au/speeches/SPE20110322TM.php. 
61 Philip Schlesinger, “Expertise, the Academy and the Governance of Cultural Policy,” Media, Culture & Society 35 (2013): 
27. 
62 Sandra Braman, “Facing In: Researchers and Academia,” in Communication Researchers and Policy-Making, ed. Sandra 
Braman (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003), 429. 
63 Clive Barnett, “The Consolations of ‘Neoliberalism’,” Geoforum 36 (2005): 8. 
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media policy that gave a greater role to industry bodies and to the free choices of consumers 
themselves.  
But in other contexts, such as those relating to the Convergence and Finkelstein Reviews, the public 
interest was seen as being served by a strengthening of laws related to media ownership and content, 
ranging from stronger public interest tests for media mergers to more effective action being taken 
towards breaches of journalistic ethics and the conduct of radio “shock jocks.” Such divergent 
positions on media regulation were clearly seen in the transition from strong support by parties such 
as the Australian Greens and Labor to “do something” about the political power of the Murdoch 
media that led to the Finkelstein Review being announced in 2011, while groups like GetUp! 
endorsed the “marketplace of ideas” over state regulation in 2013. It may be that such a divergence 
is indicative of wider tensions in progressive politics towards media reform in the 21st Century. 
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